FAQ

Experts cannot say with certainty how many nuclear weapons North Korea possesses. They can, however, estimate a range based on the amount of weapons material Pyongyang may have produced over time. Typically, those estimates run from 30-60 weapons, with the number growing over time.

Maybe. At this stage, we don’t know that North Korea can’t reach the US with an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM). North Korea has conducted ICBM tests and conducted space launches that may have advanced the capabilities of their ICBM program, but they have not demonstrated the real-world ability to deliver a payload from a missile that has re-entered the earth’s atmosphere. Perhaps they can; maybe they can’t. North Korea continues to declare that this is their objective and has sustained an active missile testing program.

North Korea can certainly strike the roughly 178 million people living in South Korea and Japan. This includes 180,000 US civilians and military personnel living in the region

Maybe. On the one hand, it seems unbelievable that someone would use nuclear weapons, if only because it could lead to their own destruction. Still, it is worth remembering that both the US and the Soviet Union planned as a matter of doctrine to use nuclear weapons, if their side was losing a major conventional war. In a crisis, Kim may come to believe his only chance for survival is using his nuclear arsenal or using his weapons before the other side uses its nuclear weapons. North Korea has already clearly stated that it would use nuclear weapons if attacked.

Our North Korea Experts Library contains short video answers to more than 20 common questions about North Korea. A variety of academic, government, and non-governmental North Korea experts tackle the questions, including former senior officials in the White House and the Department of Defense. Together they offer a wide range of analysis and perspective. Stay tuned, because we are adding new questions and new experts to the library. You can event can suggest your own questions and experts.

A second strike capability means that a country maintains the capacity to use nuclear weapons, even if it suffers a nuclear attack. For example, a country whose homeland was destroyed by nuclear weapons might nevertheless be able to guarantee its ability to deliver a retaliatory strike from nuclear-armed submarines at sea. A secure second strike capability is thought to enhance nuclear deterrence. A potential attacker knows that he too will be destroyed, even if he launches a successful surprise attack.

A ballistic missile is a delivery platform that can transport a nuclear warhead to a target. Like other delivery platforms (e.g., a plane), the “weapon” in the nuclear weapon is the warhead which carries enormous destructive power. A ballistic missile can, in principle, carry either a nuclear or a traditional (conventional) explosive. “Ballistic” refers to its flight path and is distinguished from cruise missiles, for example, which are powered and travel a largely flat trajectory. A ballistic missile, by contrast, follows a sloping upward curve, followed by a descent.

An ICBM, or inter-continental ballistic missile, is a type of ballistic missile or delivery platform that can travel extremely long, even cross-continental, distances to carry a payload to a target. Other ballistic missiles cover shorter distances, such as short-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In principle, an ICBM can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, though, in practice, ICBMs have been primarily a nuclear weapons platform.

Emerging research suggests that even a “small” nuclear war could have catastrophic climate effects, as well as regional destruction and global economic dislocation. A nuclear war anywhere will affect people everywhere, and depending on the circumstances could lead to an extinction event. For example, if 20 years from now, India and Pakistan or China and Russia fight a large-scale nuclear war, every other country would confront a potential civilization-ending scenario, despite not being involved in the conflict. For the United States, its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot prevent or deter other countries from fighting their own nuclear war.

The good news is that this terrible outcome is preventable. Countries have dismantled nuclear weapons before. In fact, the US and Russia have taken apart about 65,000 nuclear warheads. Nuclear agreements have reduced the number of nuclear tests, the number of nuclear weapons, and the rate of proliferation. Countries can choose to reduce nuclear threats. So while nuclear dangers have increased in recent years, nothing prevents governments from doing what has worked in the past.

The United States did use nuclear weapons twice in Japan during World War II, and historians point to several crises during the Cold War in which the use of nuclear weapons was actively considered, most notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis. At least 7 of the 9 countries currently armed with nuclear weapons have nuclear doctrines that provide for the use of nuclear weapons in response to losses on a conventional battlefield. This means they are willing to use nuclear weapons first in a major war. In recent years, Russia, North Korea, and the United States have all threatened the use of nuclear weapons against their adversaries.

Experts also point to circumstances, particularly in crises, where leaders can face incentives to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict, particularly if they are the weaker party and already at risk of losing everything. And these situations do not include the additional possibilities that come with error, misperception, organizational failure, and other problems in nuclear decision-making.

History proves that the public can have a very powerful influence on nuclear weapons decisions. In fact, it looks like it is difficult to achieve progress against nuclear threats unless the public cares and is engaged. Other factors also matter or can be more important than public opinion, but governments tend to avoid making hard decisions if they can, and these are hard decisions. Without a push from the public, governments pass the nuclear problem off to the future, making it even harder to resolve.

Public engagement was especially strong in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Fears about the effects of above-ground nuclear testing focused public attention on nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Again in the 1980s, concern about a potential US-Soviet nuclear conflict sparked public concern. Both periods were followed by a series of nuclear agreements that reduced the risk of nuclear conflict. Following the end of the Cold War, however, public attention shifted elsewhere, and progress began to slow. It now appears to be reversing course, as countries build more nuclear weapons, issue more nuclear threats, and abandon previous agreements.

Left to their own, governments are unlikely to make progress to prevent nuclear war. Unless they are pushed by events or the public, they will push it off to the future. One person mattered in the 1950s. One person mattered in the 1980s. And one person matters now.

Yes. Please review the Content Credits and Restrictions page for details, but essentially any content on the Content List that does not involve licensed images or video is free for public use.

The purpose of the project is to provide free, fact-based information and to stimulate conversation about the North Korean nuclear issue and the general problem of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, misinformation and disinformation have been spread online about North Korea and nuclear weapons. For example, after the nuclear false alarm in Hawai’i in 2018, rumors circulated that North Korea had developed a “super nuke”. Others alleged that the US government had secretly shot down a North Korean missile but did not want to say so publicly. (Neither was true.)

As a university-based project, we are strong believers in learning and providing an open space for fact-based discussion and analysis. Of course, not all experts agree, so we offer a variety of perspectives on different questions.