Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has scrambled international affairs around the globe, from the killing fields of Nagorno-Karabakh to the halls of the UN. One of the major areas where it is having an effect is the triangle of relations between North Korea, China, and Russia.
The three are not a tempestuous love triangle, but it is complicated. The Soviet Union was the North’s enabling founder and major patron until its collapse. After that, China more or less took over the patron role. However, both Russia and China have supported international moves to curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, even as they tried to keep good relations.
For its part, North Korea, as the weakest player, traditionally sought to play Russia and China off each other, leveraging the best deals it could. At the core of the North Korean state identity is the not unreasonable belief that big countries can’t be trusted by little countries. The smaller countries have more to lose and are likely to be sacrificed for expediency when the big country has a change of heart or a better offer.
With the war in Ukraine, this dynamic has become awkward.
Putin and Kim are now best buddies, and American analysts returning from visits to the mainland report that Beijing is not thrilled with the new Russo-Korean relationship, as it surely lowers China’s almost exclusive influence with the DPRK. A new Moscow-Pyongyang dynamic further complicates an already odd relationship between Russia and China. China says it supports Russia in Ukraine but has avoided directly helping with the war for fear of sanctions. It would be hard, for example, to say that China is “all in” for its “ally” Russia.
At this point, it is difficult to say how these evolving relations will alter the future, but it probably means that North Korea has a little more room to maneuver, and China may have a little less influence in Pyongyang.